Despite efforts to realize gender equality over the past few decades, the wage gap and underrepresentation of women in top positions remain nearly universal. Although gender discrimination and occupational self-selection certainly play a role, they do not provide a complete explanation for these persistent disparities. Recently, gender differences in competitiveness have been proposed as an explanatory factor. When given the choice between piece-rate payment schemes based on individual performance versus tournament schemes with payment contingent on outperforming an opponent, women are (on average) less likely than equally-able men to compete, thus losing out on earnings and opportunities. This gender difference is partly explained by women’s greater reluctance to take risks – tournaments are riskier since they have a greater variance in returns. In this study, we examined whether altering the level of risk inherent in competitions could persuade women to engage in a greater number of competitions compared to men.

We provide 602 (48% female) participants recruited from an online marketplace with the option to compete in either multiple, low-stakes math tournaments (low-risk option) or a single, high-stakes math tournament (high-risk option). Total possible earnings and length of time were identical for both options. More women (56%) than men (41%) chose the multiple tournaments option (p < .001). Risk-aversion positively predicted the preference for multiple tournaments, but the gender difference in choice remained after controlling for demographic and psychological variables, including attitudes to risk. Promotion practices at firms are often structured around competition because they boost employee performance. Importantly, both options similarly enhanced performance. Our findings suggest that offering multiple, smaller competitions in place of fewer large competitions may encourage women to compete more without sacrificing employee output.